Naval War College Review
Volume 60
Number 1 Winter

Article 5

2007

The Limits of Intelligence in
MaritimeCounterproliferation Operations
Craig H. Allen

Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review
Recommended Citation
Allen, Craig H. (2007) "The Limits of Intelligence in MaritimeCounterproliferation Operations," Naval War College Review: Vol. 60 :
No. 1 , Article 5.
Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol60/iss1/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu.

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

Allen: The Limits of Intelligence in MaritimeCounterproliferation Operat

THE LIMITS OF INTELLIGENCE IN MARITIME
COUNTERPROLIFERATION OPERATIONS
Craig H. Allen

I

t might come as a surprise to many of those immersed in the current debate over
how best to guard against the further proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) that the alarm over the “growing number of nations in positions to
acquire mass annihilation weapons” and the potentially synergistic threat of
state-sponsored terrorism was sounded at least two decades ago, in Reagan-era
1
naval maritime strategy documents authored by Admiral James Watkins. Naval
forces have long been at the vanguard of global counterproliferation efforts.
Nearly a half-century ago, the Navy was tasked with establishing and enforcing a
“quarantine” to intercept Soviet nuclear missile shipments to Cuba. In the intervening years, the maritime components of combined and joint force commands,
along with the U.S. Coast Guard elements of the National Fleet, have frequently
been called upon to stem the flow of contraband by sea. The debt owed by the naval
forces to the intelligence community for the success of those operations is well doc2
umented. All would likely agree, however, that the magnitude of the threat posed by
WMD proliferation demands that the entire spectrum of counterproliferation
measures and supporting intelligence activities be subject to continuous scrutiny,
with a view to improving the accuracy and speed of the processes.
In 2003, President George W. Bush launched the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) to counter the proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems and
Professor Allen, of the University of Washington School
thus prevent them from falling into the hands of
of Law (where he is Judson Falknor Professor of Law), is
rogue regimes and terrorist organizations. The PSI
the Charles H. Stockton Chair in International Law at
has been described as a political commitment, not a
the Naval War College for 2006–2007. He served in the
3
Marine Corps from 1969 to 1971 and retired from the
new legal obligation or international organization.
Coast Guard in 1994.
Although it came under criticism in its first year, by
the time of the third anniversary meeting in Krakow
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in 2006 sixty-six states had signaled their support for the PSI; the Russian Federation had joined the original group of core participants; the participating
5
states had adopted a Statement of Interdiction Principles; and six flag states had
6
entered into treaties to facilitate PSI boardings of their vessels. In 2004, the
United Nations Security Council added to the legitimacy of the fledgling PSI approach by acknowledging the threat to international peace and security posed by
WMD proliferation and underscoring the need for states to prohibit illicit prolif7
eration and to cooperate in measures to enforce those prohibitions. Multilateral
cooperation and coordination measures like the PSI provide a flexible, responsive, non-treaty-based approach to achieving the Security Council mandate for
cooperation.
The long-term practical and political success of a counterproliferation initiative like the PSI will be determined in large measure by the availability of timely
and accurate intelligence to the decision makers and their field operators. “Practical” success will turn on the extent to which, through inducement, deterrence,
prevention, and interdiction, the production or transfer of weapons of mass destruction and their related materials and delivery systems from producer to the
aspiring user is thwarted. Because the PSI, like the more recently launched global
maritime partnership concept, is indeed a “political” commitment and not a legally binding international obligation, actual and perceived legitimacy will be
crucial to its long-term viability. Legitimacy will be enhanced if operations are
grounded in accurate intelligence, interference with navigation rights is minimized, the use of force is strictly limited to that which is necessary and reasonable, and the interdicting states demonstrate their willingness to compensate
those who suffer losses as a result of PSI interdictions that later prove unfounded. Intrusive interdictions based on intelligence that ultimately proves
faulty will tend to erode public confidence in the program and may shake the resolve of other PSI participating states. Unjustified counterproliferation operations might also undermine the already fragile nonproliferation regime. It is
readily apparent that the information demands of counterproliferation forces
will present a daunting challenge for the intelligence community.
This article begins with an examination of the intelligence needs of those engaged in maritime counterproliferation efforts. It then turns to risk-management
decision making under conditions of uncertainty, focusing on decisions at the
operational level and exploring the question of whether decision strategies in
the WMD context should seek to minimize false-negative or false-positive errors. It concludes that even vastly improved maritime intelligence will not obviate the need for national and operational commanders to make decisions under
conditions of uncertainty and that such decisions should be made on the basis
of established risk-assessment and management principles. At the same time,
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risk management analysis must be sensitive to the public’s attitude toward risk.
When possession of WMD is at stake, sound risk management that gives appropriate weight to the public’s preferences might well call for action even where the
relevant event probabilities are quite low.
INTELLIGENCE DEMANDS OF MARITIME
COUNTERPROLIFERATION OPERATIONS
Maritime counterproliferation operations are but one component of the global
and national WMD proliferation risk management strategy. Like all risk management strategies, the WMD strategy process begins with a risk assessment.8
Where possession or use of weapons of mass destruction is at risk, estimates
must look beyond mere event probabilities; they must fairly weigh the extraordinary magnitude of the risks. It is often said that the detonation or release of a
weapon of mass destruction, particularly a nuclear device, is a low-probability
event—even an extremely low probability event—but one with destructive potential so enormous that it presents what most consider to be an unacceptable
9
risk. To this observation risk management analysts often add the warning that
in responding to WMD risks, managers must be successful in their risk management measures every time, while the malefactors who would unleash such weap10
ons need be successful only once.
The U.S. National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction establishes
among its highest intelligence priorities “a more accurate and complete under11
standing of the full range of WMD threats.” It emphasizes that intelligence will
be crucial in developing effective counterproliferation policies and capabilities
and in deterring and defending against known proliferators and terrorist orga12
nizations. The president’s directive on maritime security policy similarly emphasizes the importance of a “robust and coordinated intelligence effort [that]
13
serves as the foundation for effective security efforts in the maritime domain.”
It was in response to this directive that a number of integrated maritime security
planning documents, including the National Strategy for Maritime Security and
the National Plan for Achieving Maritime Domain Awareness, were produced. To
meet more effectively the urgent demand for maritime domain intelligence integration and distribution, the president further tasked the involved agencies to
prepare the document that became the Plan for Global Maritime Intelligence In14
tegration (or GMII Plan). The closely related Maritime Operational Threat Response Plan (MOTR Plan) provides the framework for coordinated, unified,
timely, and effective response planning and operational command and control
of maritime security incidents.15
Decades of experience in narcotics interdiction and the testimony of thousands of boarding officers witness the inestimable value of intelligence to
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maritime interception operations. The forces available for maritime counterproliferation operations are finite, not nearly adequate to cover the world’s
oceans or to board even a fraction of the vessels operating on those oceans.
Moreover, the dangers and practical difficulties demand that at-sea boardings
and searches be relied upon only when warranted by the circumstances. Finally,
the president has made it clear that maritime interception and enforcement
should be conducted in a manner that does not unnecessarily interfere with maritime commerce or the freedom of navigation. Better intelligence reduces the
potential for unwarranted interference with those vital interests.
The intelligence community, including any organic components of the operating forces involved, provides (in the language of the well known “OODA loop”)
the “observe” and “orient” bases by which those charged with control over opera17
tions are to “decide” and “act.” The intelligence demands of counterproliferation
decision makers and operators will likely differ in several respects from those of
their nonproliferation counterparts. Not least among the differences will be the
timeliness demands of a forwardleaning counterproliferation stratLosses that could result from a false negative
egy that envisions interdicting
might well be incalculable.
WMD shipments during transit.
The nonproliferation program relies chiefly on relatively long-term, strategic intelligence; by contrast, counterproliferation operations demand timely indications and warnings intelligence for each component in a layered defense scheme.
The inverse relationship between certainty and speed is readily apparent: any additional time allocated to the observe and orient phases comes at the expense of
the time remaining to decide and act. Not everyone agrees with how the time
available should be allocated. Those charged with tactical thinking tend to emphasize speed of decision making (“faster is better”), while those entrusted with
strategy are more inclined to prefer accuracy (“smarter is better”).
Multilateral activities introduce an additional consideration. Multilateral decision processes virtually always take longer to develop, and they generally raise
the intelligence bar, because the level of certainty for multilateral actions must
meet the standard set by the most demanding participant. Interagency consultation processes like the scheme established by the MOTR Plan may have the same
effect. Additionally, if the intercepting forces must first obtain the consent of the
vessel’s flag state or a coastal state, that government’s information requirements
must be met, even if disclosure might compromise intelligence sources or methods. The flag state will likely demand more information and greater certainty
where the vessel must be diverted to accomplish the boarding or when force
might be necessary to compel compliance.
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Intelligence in support of counterproliferation must be adequate to answer
the most pressing questions that maritime interception forces will pose regard18
ing shipments of WMD and related materials. The intelligence challenge will
19
often begin with the “What?” question. It is improbable (but nonetheless possible) that proliferators would attempt to transport an assembled and operational WMD device via commercial seagoing vessels. It is more probable that
maritime shipments would consist of components, precursors, or small quantities of fissile or radiological materials. In some cases those materials would be
dual-use in nature, presenting additional challenges for analysts and operators,
who might not be familiar with the characteristics and applications of the mate20
rials or equipment.
The second challenge will be to provide answers to the “Who?” question:
Who are the parties to the suspected WMD transfer and transport transaction?
It is necessary to know the identities of the consignor, consignee, and the owner
and flag of the vessel, in order to assess the risk and determine which states
might have jurisdiction over the vessel and whose consent or cooperation would
therefore facilitate interdiction. Closely related to “Who?” is the question of the
actors’ intent: Why are they seeking the materials or equipment? Intent—which,
unlike “Who?” and What?,” always requires analysis—is critical where dual-use
materials or equipment are involved. Whether a given shipment is illicit and a
candidate for interdiction may turn on the identity of the end user and the nature of the intended end use. Analysts and commanders evaluating possible
courses of action and the urgency of the need for action understand that the risk
posed by the availability of WMD is in part determined by the willingness of the
entity in possession to deploy the weapon.
The next questions the commander is likely to ask in forming an estimate of
the situation and choosing a course of action concern time and space factors:
Where and when will the illicit WMD likely be transported, and, perhaps, how
will it be carried out? Interdictions at sea can present significant legal and practical problems. The intelligence community must be prepared to provide, if possible, accurate information on both the location of the ship and the illicit
materials onboard. The “When?” question should produce an assessment of the
last practicable opportunity to prevent the delivery of WMD materials to the
state or nonstate actor of proliferation concern. For a variety of reasons, dockside inspections are preferable to at-sea boardings. Maritime interception forces
in receipt of information that a ship under charter to a well known commercial
carrier is believed to have ten drums of chemical warfare component materials
in one or more of five thousand containers will likely explore alternatives to
boarding at sea, perhaps raising the always contentious question of whether the
intelligence is sufficiently reliable to justify diverting the vessel to a port.
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Decision makers and operators will also want to know who else might be involved in the transaction. Interdicting a shipment is only one element of the larger
counterproliferation strategy. The emergence of proliferation networks, such as
the lucrative multinational enterprise operated out of Pakistan by A. Q. Kahn, amply demonstrates that nonstate actors now participate as both suppliers and
21
consumers of WMD technology. Those global networks must be identified and
interdicted as well. The networks’ financial assets must also be located and frozen
or seized. Finally, decision makers will want to know the degree of confidence in
the intelligence assessment. In many cases, it will be based on analysts’ subjective
judgment of probability. In contrast to objective probabilities—derived, for instance, from accurate and reliable sources like mortality tables—subjective
probabilities involve events the likelihood of which can only be estimated, based
in part on the judgment and experience of the analyst. (For example, President
John F. Kennedy is said to have estimated the probability of war with the Soviet
Union during the Cuban missile crisis as one in three.) Because such judgments
are influenced by a variety of factors and are subject to cognitive errors, they are
22
likely to differ from one person to another. Candid evaluations that are clear
about the bases of the probability assessment, any ambiguities in the evidence
relied on, the degree of uncertainty, and whether competing theories or dissenting views exist are indispensable to decision makers, who must evaluate the assessment (and the assessors), weigh the respective event probabilities, and
project the potential consequences of an erroneous decision.
RISK ASSESSMENT WHEN POSSESSION OF WMD IS AT STAKE
Since we recognize the limits of combating WMD intelligence, planning
and execution decisions will be made using limited or incomplete
information.
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF (2006)

The chairman’s statement reminds us that limited or incomplete intelligence re23
garding a WMD threat does not obviate planning and execution decisions. The
geostrategic environment of the twenty-first century is frequently described as
one fraught with uncertainty and subject to rapid and sometimes radical
change. If one defines certainty as precluding any possibility of subsequent challenge in light of additional or more accurate observations or more comprehensive reasoning, uncertainty seems inevitable in the maritime counterproliferation
operating environment.
Although we must accept that national security decisions must on occasion
be made on the basis of incomplete or uncertain information, we may nevertheless expect them to be tempered with practical wisdom and mature judgment.
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Even so, we must admit that time for making decisions is not unlimited. The
commander must be prepared to complete the observation-to-action decision
loop before the adversary can deliver or acquire that weapon of mass destruction. The greater certainty accruing from multiple corroborating sources may
increase confidence but also impose delays the commander cannot afford.
It is important to bear in mind also that even “correct” decisions do not ineluctably produce desired outcomes. Whether a decision was correct must be
judged by the quality and quantity of information reasonably available at the
24
time it was made, not by that which was only revealed later. The goal, of course,
is to timely reach the correct conclusion despite any information deficit; however, the possibility of error can rarely be eliminated altogether.
Under international law and the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles,
boardings must generally be predicated on some level of suspicion of illicit activity, described by such vague formulae as a “reasonable ground” to suspect or
25
“good cause” to believe that the vessel is engaged in the illicit activity. Under
U.S. law, the standard for arrest or seizure is typically “probable cause” to believe
a crime has occurred. It is noteworthy that none of these measures require for
field action anything approaching certainty “beyond a reasonable doubt.” The
practical reasons are apparent. A requirement for prior certainty that a vessel is
engaged in piracy sets the bar impossibly high, permitting the vessel to operate
without fear of interdiction so long as it hides the evidence reasonably well.
Moreover, the degree of intrusion represented by a boarding is far less than that
of seizure or arrest. The information that warrants visit or boarding might also
be necessary to persuade the vessel’s flag state or a coastal state through whose
waters it will pass to authorize yet another state, which is willing and able to
board, search, and perhaps seize the vessel, to do so. That second state is, of
course, free to set its own standard for information reliability, either by treaty or
ad hoc agreement.
The Value of “Good” Intelligence
The intelligence community’s predilection for modest silence is well known.
With few exceptions, intelligence agencies are not given to self-promoting publicity following intelligence “successes.” The transparency that is otherwise the
hallmark of constitutional democracies is antithetical to the long-term success
of the intelligence community. It should come as no surprise, therefore, that
states participating in the PSI, knowing that illicit proliferators would take advantage of such announcements to probe for weaknesses, have given notice that
26
they may never reveal many of their interdiction activities. Unfortunately, denying proliferators and transporters such an opportunity means that the public
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and nonparticipating states will often have no direct means of learning of the
27
program’s accomplishments.
There is no shortage of books, articles, and congressional or commission re28
ports documenting actual or perceived intelligence “failures.” Almost none salute the intelligence community’s many successes. Modern critics might offer a
brief tip of the hat to the courage and resourcefulness of the Office of Strategic
Services operatives and code breakers in World War II, and perhaps to the U-2
pilots who risked (and, in one case, lost) their lives obtaining the photo images of
the Soviet missile sites in Cuba that Ambassador Adlai Stevenson displayed so effectively to the Security Council, but then they tend to focus their attention
quickly on the failures. Accordingly, it is fitting to acknowledge briefly two recent
intelligence success stories involving maritime counterproliferation operations.
The first involved the interdiction of the North Korean cargo vessel So San.

Spanish marines were forced to fast-rope onto deck of So San when it refused to comply with boarding requests.
U.S. Navy, released by Spanish Defense Ministry

In late 2002, American intelligence agencies had good reason to believe that a
vessel later identified as the So San was transporting missiles from North Korea.
They were uncertain, however, of the cargo’s destination. The U.S. Navy eventually
requested that a Spanish warship intercept the vessel and board it on the high seas
off the coast of Yemen. A team of Spanish marines from the frigate Navarra, later
joined by U.S. Navy personnel, conducted a noncompliant boarding of the So San
and during the subsequent search discovered North Korean–made Scud missiles
and components hidden beneath the cargo of bagged cement. Not surprisingly,
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the missiles were not listed in the vessel’s manifest. Although the ship and
cargo were eventually released at the
request of the government of Yemen,
to which it was learned that the missiles were being shipped, the interdiction demonstrated the capability of
the intelligence community to detect
and track maritime WMD shipments
over considerable distances. Much of
the information on the So San interdiction remains classified; however,
publicly available accounts suggest
that intelligence assets detected the
missiles being loaded in North Korea
and tracked the vessel from there to
29
the interception point. Apparently,
however, the intelligence community
was unable to determine the buyer’s
30
identity before the boarding.
The second incident involved
the multilateral interdiction of the
The boarding team discovered fifteen disassembled Scud missiles concealed under tons of
bagged cement.
German-flag BBC China in October
U.S. Navy, released by Spanish Defense Ministry
2003. American and British intelligence agencies concluded that the
BBC China was transporting component parts for uranium enrichment centrifuges from Dubai to Libya. Demonstrating the kind of cooperation the PSI was
designed to foster, Germany agreed to order the vessel to divert to a port in Italy
for inspection. The vessel’s owner and master readily complied with the flag
state’s order. Italy then agreed to allow the vessel to enter one of its ports and to
conduct the search. The intelligence proved accurate, leading to the discovery of
thousands of parts for gas centrifuges of a kind that can be used to enrich uranium. Some suggest that the BBC China interdiction contributed to Libya’s decision in late 2003 to abandon its WMD program.
Intelligence, Inferential Errors, and Risk Management Decisions
The fulcrum of the debate over intelligence and WMD counterproliferation in
the coming years will likely be the relationship between the tolerance for risk
and error, on the one hand, and our willingness to bear the financial, societal,
31
and political costs of incremental security measures, on the other. As President
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Bush remarked in response to the report of the 9/11 Commission, “There is no
32
such thing as perfect security in our vast, free Nation.” Nor do security decision
makers often have the luxury of waiting for complete and perfect information,
or for intelligence that provides the kind of assurance Israelis have described (in
33
the Karine A war materiel interdiction) as “unequivocal, clear, and undeniable.”
The goal therefore cannot be perfect security but rather optimal security, and
optimal security decisions will inevitably be based not on perfect knowledge but
34
on optimal intelligence assessments.
On occasion, the assessments made by the intelligence community will later
prove to be wrong. Error may result from information that is incomplete, conflicting, or susceptible to more than one plausible interpretation or inference. To
simplify the analysis in this
counterproliferation setting it
[Risk] managers must be successful . . . every
will be helpful to posit that the
time, while the malefactors who would un“wrong” inference or conclusion
leash [WMD] need be successful only once.
might take one of two hypothetical forms. In the first, a ship that intelligence analysts have concluded is transporting WMD components is intercepted and boarded at sea; an exhaustive,
day-long search reveals that the intelligence assessment was wrong and the ves35
sel’s cargo is entirely legitimate. In the second, a ship that is in fact transporting
a WMD to a densely populated port city is not boarded because the decision
maker concludes that there is insufficient evidence. Surveillance of the vessel is
later lost when it enters a crowded traffic lane, and the weapon is delivered and
later detonated in the city. Those charged with responsibility for the decision in
the OODA cycle must be prepared to determine which of the two erroneous outcomes poses the more serious risk (just as the criminal justice system did by
adopting a “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard to minimize the chance of
wrongly convicting a person of a crime). A false positive in a counterproliferation operation may require the interdicting state to issue an apology
and provide appropriate compensation to the vessel inconvenienced. Losses that
could result from a false negative might well be incalculable. As the U.S. National
Security Strategy declares:
The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction—and the more compelling the
case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to
the time and place of the enemy’s attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile attacks by
our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively.36

The False Positive Error. Statistical decision theory recognizes two types of inferential error. The false positive, or Type I, error refers to a conclusion that a
condition exists or a proposition is true when in fact the condition does not exist
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or the proposition is not true. Prewar intelligence estimates of Iraq’s WMD,
characterized on one occasion as a “slam dunk,” present a recent and notorious
example of such a “false positive” error, as was the less well publicized four-day
37
boarding of the container ship Palermo Senator in 2003.
A 1993 incident involving the Chinese containership Yin He and the 1998
cruise missile strike on a Sudanese chemical plant in Al Shifa are cited as examples of the kind of international embarrassment the United States can expect to
38
suffer by taking action based on a false-positive intelligence assessment. The
United States alleged that the Yin He was carrying chemical precursors that
39
could be used to produce mustard and sarin nerve gases from China to Iran.
Secretary of State Warren Christopher publicly asserted that the intelligence on
the Yin He was reliable. In fact, an American intelligence official went so far as to
declare, “We know these chemicals are bound for Iran’s chemical weapons
40
plants, and it is a lot of tonnage, tens of tons.” China vehemently disputed the
U.S. allegation, but it eventually agreed to a boarding of the vessel in a Saudi Arabian port. The inspection by Saudi officials, accompanied by American technical advisers, uncovered no trace of the precursors American intelligence officials
had alleged were aboard. Beijing blasted the United States for acting like a “self41
styled world cop.” Nevertheless, the United States refused to offer either an
42
apology or compensation for the vessel’s delay; Washington asserted that it had
43
“had sufficient credible evidence that those items were in the cargo.”
In the latter incident, the United States struck the Al Shifa plant in the belief,
based on intelligence, that the plant was engaged in producing chemical warfare
agents. Poststrike investigations revealed that the assessment was almost certainly wrong.
At most, decision makers who rely on a false positive assessment may be accused of being rash or alarmist and may be required to issue apologies or compensate the owner of a vessel or cargo. However, frequent or egregious actions
taken on the basis of erroneous intelligence will eventually undermine public
44
and partner-states’ confidence in the program. False positive errors can also
demoralize members of the intelligence community and may cause them (and
operational commanders) to be more cautious, more guarded, and less willing
45
to pass on preliminary or tentative findings in the future. Ironically, such wariness might lead to errors of the opposite kind, demonstrating the interdependence of errors caused by too much and too little caution. Finally, false positives,
like false negatives, can educate would-be proliferators and transporters on the
tactics and methods employed by counterproliferation forces, providing them
with information useful in circumventing the regime’s strengths and exploiting
its weaknesses.
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The False Negative Error. The false negative, or Type II, error is committed by
concluding that a condition does not exist or that a proposition is not true when
in fact the condition does exist or the proposition is true. For example, a provocative quarantine might be imposed around Cuba on the assumption that even if
the situation escalates, Soviet troops on the island number only three thousand
46
and that no nuclear weapons or missile delivery systems are available to them.
Or a hypothesis that a handful of Muslim extremists have enrolled in flying lessons in preparation for turning airliners into instruments of mass devastation
might be erroneously dismissed as too far-fetched. At best, erroneous false negative decisions simply delay responsive action.47 At worst, they may convince
those with blind spots or a high tolerance for risk that it is safe to open the city’s
gates and wheel that massive wooden horse inside.
ACTING ON UNCERTAIN RISK ASSESSMENTS WHEN POSSESSION
OF WMD IS AT STAKE
War is the realm of uncertainty; three-fourths of the factors on which
action in war is based are wrapped in a fog of greater or lesser uncertainty. A sensitive and discriminating judgment is called for.
CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR

Risk assessments help us categorize and quantify a risk, but they do not tell us
48
what, if anything, to do about it. That second question falls in the domain of
risk management, which nearly always entails a policy judgment. Decisional
49
“purists” will ground their decision on objective risk-management principles.
The purist’s approach evaluates the various alternative courses of action applying decisional criteria that include an alternative’s predicted effectiveness in producing the desired result and the cost of achieving that result in that fashion.
Those who define their decisional criteria more broadly will also consider the
public’s likely reaction to the decision. Where the decision is a binary one—
between interdicting a vessel and taking no action, where a subjective probability assessment indicates a risk that it is transporting WMD—the latter group
will factor in the public’s attitude toward risk. Put another way, these analysts
will ask how cautious the public expects its national and homeland-security
leadership to be.
The nation’s reaction to the 11 September 2001 attacks and to the 9/11 Commission hearings and report suggest that as a nation the United States is risk
averse, preferring the embarrassment of an occasional false positive to the potential horrors of a false negative. To the extent they were willing to accept errors
of any kind, the majority of Americans appeared to demand that the risk
of “false negatives” be minimized, if not eliminated, when the threat is to the
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50

homeland. Some would characterize their preference as one akin to the “precautionary approach” advocated by many environmentalists, wherein lack of
51
certainty regarding a risk does not excuse failure to take avoiding action. Two
critical considerations are less clear, however. The first concerns the cost the
public is willing to bear for a true precautionary approach to homeland security.
That cost includes not only the financial costs of an enhanced security system
but also possible criticism from abroad and encroachments on civil liberties.
The second concerns the chronic tendency toward short-term thinking, what
some derisively refer to as “strategic attention deficit disorder,” perhaps coupled
with what cognitive psychologists call the “availability heuristic”—the tendency
to make judgments about the future based not upon a broad body of historical
evidence but on recent, vivid events that skew perceptions. The cautionary preferences manifested in late 2001 or when the 9/11 Commission first denounced a
collective “failure of imagination” may not reflect preferences five or ten years
after the traumatic event.
In assessing the public’s attitude toward risk and the consequences of error
we must also be mindful of the political and media reaction to the most significant false positive error in recent history—the prewar intelligence assessments
52
of Iraq’s WMD program. Like the pre-9/11 risk assessment of the homeland’s
vulnerability to large-scale terrorist attacks, they may be reduced for analytic
purposes to an intelligence judgment that presented decision
The information demands of counterm a ke r s w i t h t wo p o s s i b l e
proliferation forces will present a daunting
“truths”: either Iraq was engaged
challenge for the intelligence community.
in a clandestine program to produce WMD or it had abandoned its earlier design and production activities and
disposed of its stockpiles. In this light a rational decision maker following accepted risk management principles would have to consider, among other things,
53
the respective consequences of a false positive and a false negative error. As
Philip Bobbitt, former strategic planning director of the National Security
Council, has argued, judgments regarding the consequences of an erroneous decision might actually cause a decision maker to pursue a course of action that is
54
not based on the state of affairs analysts have concluded is the most probable.
Under accepted risk management principles, if a scenario with a lesser, but still
significant, probability presents an overall risk that the decision maker deems
unacceptable (as measured by the magnitude of the expected harm, discounted
by the event’s probability), the “correct” course may be to abate or at least reduce
that risk. Bobbitt further warns that in judging a decision we must avoid
“Parmenides’ fallacy,” which occurs when one assesses the correctness of a decision based solely on the state of affairs it produced, without comparing that state
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of affairs to the outcomes that would have been produced if one of the alterna55
tive courses of action had been chosen. One need not delve deeply into notions
of efficient or proximate cause to understand that any given end state is the
product of a multitude of causes and factors, many of which are not under the
control of the decision maker.
Those charged with making and acting on national security decisions regarding
weapons of mass destruction should never accept less than the best available intelligence; nonetheless, they must also be prepared to make timely decisions
when that intelligence falls short of certainty. Excoriating the intelligence community or decision makers for committing false-positive errors even though
they followed appropriate risk assessment and management methods risks driving them in the future to accept a higher risk of false negatives or at least to be
more reluctant to take action on probable but uncertain intelligence assessments. Such tendencies would undermine a precautionary approach. The longterm political success of counterproliferation operations requires that both
intelligence analysts and operations decision makers be candid with regard to
uncertainties. An intelligence agency that represents an assessment on weapons
of mass destruction as a “slam dunk” will find its credibility seriously questioned. For the same reason, the cost of error should not fall on the innocent
shipowner. States conducting maritime interception operations must be prepared to compensate for any loss or damage caused by operations that turn out
to be unwarranted.
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54. See Philip Bobbitt, “Seeing the Futures,” New
York Times, 8 December 2003.
55. Philip Bobbitt, “Today’s War against Tomorrow’s Iraq,” New York Times, 10 March 2003.
The relevant question would therefore not be
whether we are better off or safer today than
we were before an action was taken, but
whether we are better off or safer than we
would have been had we pursued an alternative course of action, including taking no
action.
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